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INTRODUCTION
“Ground zero” for sex and labor trafficking.1 A “hotbed” for sex
trafficking activity.2 This is not what one would normally think of
when referring to hotel establishments across the country. However,
media stories, reports, and lawsuits are increasingly exposing this
alarming reality about our nation’s hotels.3 Many children, women,
and men are being forced into sex trafficking at hotels and lodging
establishments across the country.4 In response to this disheartening
reality, a number of states have passed laws that currently allow for
victims to hold hotels civilly liable for sex trafficking under a
“facilitator” or “beneficiary” liability theory.5 These state statutes are
modeled after § 1595 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA),6 which provides
for civil liability for “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that
person knew or should have known has engaged in [sex trafficking].”7
Additionally, many states have enacted laws that mandate that antitrafficking training and protocols be implemented at hotels and motels
1. Michael Joe Murphy, Hotel-Motel Sex Trafficking—Florida Is Ripe for a Crackdown,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-fla-motel-hotelhuman-trafficking-crackdown-bills-20180208-story.html.
2. Monika, Sleep Tight: What Hotels Are Doing to Fight Human Trafficking,
INTERNATIONELLE (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.internationelle.org/hotels-against-trafficking/
(“Labor trafficking, sex trafficking . . . human trafficking. All of which can be found in the hotel
industry. In an industry worth over $150 billion, it's no surprise that the anonymity of hotels
provides a hotbed . . . of trafficking activity.” (first omission in original)); Plaintiff’s Original
Petition at 56, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 2018-04501 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018) (“In a
recent Blue Campaign bulletin, the Department of Homeland Security outlines that traffickers have
long used the hotel industry as a hotbed for human trafficking and has recommended policies and
procedures that the industry can take to help prevent human trafficking and the sexual exploitation
of minors.”).
3. See sources cited supra note 2.
4. See Hotline Statistics, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE,
https://humantraffickinghotline.org/states (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (data current through Dec. 31,
2019).
5. See Lori Nazry Ross, See No Evil: A Look at Florida’s Legislative Response to Holding
Hotels Civilly Liable for “Turning a Blind Eye” to the Sex Trafficking Monster Hiding Behind
Closed Doors, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 390–99 (2020); see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3051(a)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 98.002 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg.
Sess. of the 86th Leg.); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-157 (West, Westlaw through Act 2020-206).
6. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in various sections of 6 U.S.C, 8 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 22 U.S.C, and 42 U.S.C.).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018); see Ross, supra note 5, at 390.
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for their employees.8 As a result of the federal and state statutes
allowing for civil liability against hotels under a “beneficiary liability”
theory, there has been a surge in the United States of beneficiary
liability lawsuits being filed by sex trafficking victims against hotels.9
As the number of these types of suits has rapidly increased in the last
few years, with a particular uptick in 2019,10 there has also been an
increase in related declaratory judgment actions being brought by
insurers against their hotel insureds.11 These insurers are asking
courts to find that the insurer does not have a duty to defend or
indemnify in the underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability
suits based on certain policy exclusions.12 Recently, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Motel
Management Services, Inc.,13 affirmed a 2018 decision by a
Pennsylvania federal district court ruling that the assault and battery
exclusion at issue in the case barred coverage for the claims in the
underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability action against the

8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-106g (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Reg. Sess., the
2020 July Spec. Sess., and the 2020 Sept. Spec. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 157.177 (West, Westlaw
from the 2020 Reg. Sess. and 1st through 7th Spec. Sess.); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.3 (Deering
2021); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 206-f (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2020, ch. 1 to 387); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 509.096(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 184 of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 26th
Leg.).
9. Corinne Ramey, Lawsuits Accuse Big Hotel Chains of Allowing Sex Trafficking, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuits-accuse-big-hotel-chains-of-allowingsex-trafficking-11583317800; see, e.g., Complaint, M.B. v. Roosevelt Inn LLC, No. 170300712
(Pa. Ct. C.P. Mar. 10, 2017); Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 201804501 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018); Notice of Removal, K.R. v. Backpage.com, No. 1:17-cv00299 (M.D. Ala. May 5, 2017); Complaint, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (No. 2:19-cv-00849); Complaint, H.H. v. G6 Hosp. LLC, No. 2:19cv-00755 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2019); Complaint, B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No.
5:20-cv-00656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020); Complaint, J.L. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., No. 1:19-cv03713 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2019).
10. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9.
11. See Emily Adams & Shubhra Mashelkar, Human Trafficking Lawsuits and the Hotel
Industry, HOTEL BUS. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.hotelbusiness.com/human-traffickinglawsuits-and-the-hotel-industry/#:~:text=In%202019%20alone%2C%20no%20less,in%20connect
ion%20with%20human%20trafficking; see, e.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc.
(Nautilus I), 320 F. Supp. 3d 636 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019); Ricchio
v. Bijal, Inc. (Peerless), 424 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2019); Complaint, Atain Specialty Ins. Co.
v. Varahi Hotel, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-01582-WMR (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2020) [hereinafter Atain
Complaint]; Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03172-PKC
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Starr Complaint].
12. Cf. Adams & Mashelkar, supra note 11 (as liability lawsuits continue to increase, it follows
that there is also an increase in these hotels’ insurance companies filing declaratory judgements to
avoid defending the hotels and to avoid being held liable).
13. 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019).
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hotel defendants, thus relinquishing the insurer’s duty to defend and
indemnify the hotel insured.14
Following Nautilus, in November of 2019, a federal district court
in Massachusetts came to a different conclusion in Ricchio v. Bijal,
Inc.15 (“Peerless”) holding that the insurer in that case did in fact have
a duty to defend its hotel insured in the sex trafficking beneficiary
liability lawsuit filed against the hotel by an alleged trafficking
victim.16 The court reasoned that a “criminal acts” exclusion did not
preclude the possibility of liability coverage.17
Nautilus and Peerless appear to be the first two decisions
addressing this critical coverage issue. Thus, an examination of these
opinions, the arguments made by the parties, and the policy exclusions
at issue may provide guidance as to how courts will handle this crucial
issue moving forward.
This Article posits that insurers, by way of their declaratory
judgment actions, can serve as a regulator for hotels in the fight against
sex trafficking. Insurance law scholars have argued that insurance
companies are increasingly serving as “corporate regulators.”18
Moreover, “insurance institutions act as risk regulators and regulate so
many aspects of an . . . organization’s relationships in society.”19
Accordingly, insurance companies can use their risk management
tools to impact how a corporation complies with laws and heighten
their commitment to corporate social responsibility.20 Exclusions to
coverage are one type of risk management tool that can be used to
incentivize corporations to reduce risks.21 In fact, some scholars have
reasoned that risk management tools such as policy exclusions
decrease “moral hazard”—the concept that an insured will relax the
care he or she takes in safeguarding his or her property as a result of
having insurance, because the insured knows that the loss will be

14. Id. at 61.
15. 424 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2019).
16. Id. at 195.
17. See id.
18. Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 465 (2017).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 466.
21. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2012).
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covered entirely or partly by the insurer.22 Exclusions allow the
responsibility of particular policy losses to rest solely with insureds,
which can lead to them stepping up their preventive efforts to reduce
risks.23 It is my contention that the threat of hotels not being provided
insurance coverage due to policy exclusions, and thus having to
exclusively bear defense costs and potentially huge damage awards,
will likely decrease the chance of moral hazard by hotels and motivate
them to institute anti-trafficking preventative measures to end the
grave reality of sex trafficking in the hotel environment.
I have previously argued the importance of creating legal and
financial repercussions for the hotel industry through exposure to
sex trafficking beneficiary liability suits and how that exposure can
serve as an incentive for hotels implementing anti-trafficking
training measures to educate their workers on the warning indicia of
trafficking and proper reporting procedures.24
This Article builds on that argument and contends that just as
litigation exposure for hotels facing actions by sex trafficking victims
can serve as an impetus for corporate responsibility in helping to
eliminate the evils of sex trafficking, so can the risk of not being
provided a defense or indemnification by an insurer promote a sense
of corporate responsibility amongst hotels, and ultimately prompt
change. Even if courts ultimately find, however, that insurers have to
defend and indemnify hotel insureds, insurers can still serve as
regulators in the fight to end sex trafficking in the hotel industry by
employing other risk management tools such as auditing, training, and
educational services.
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of the pervasiveness
of sex trafficking at hotels, the federal Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (TVPA),25 and the TVRPA. Part II discusses the emergence of
recent sex trafficking beneficiary litigation against hotels under 18
U.S.C. § 1595(a) of the TVPRA. Part III analyzes the role of the
insurer as a regulator in the fight to end sex trafficking at hotels. Part
22. See id. at 199, 209 (acknowledging that insurance coverage can destroy incentives for care
with insureds in certain circumstances and the use of exclusions can thwart this potential).
23. George L. Priest, A Principled Approach Toward Insurance Law: The Economics of
Insurance and the Current Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635, 648 (2017).
24. Ross, supra note 5, at 380.
25. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C.,
27 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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IV proceeds by examining the ground-breaking Nautilus and Peerless
decisions, the first of these declaratory judgment actions where courts
have ruled on exclusions for coverage in sex trafficking beneficiary
liability claims against hotels. This Part of the Article seeks to serve
as an informative tool, providing guidance on the potential issues
before courts hearing these actions and the stance that other courts may
take in the future. Part IV concludes by discussing the rise of other
declaratory judgment actions following Nautilus and Peerless, the
implications that Nautilus and Peerless may have on other emerging
declaratory actions, and the possibility of insurers using additional risk
management tools to help end sex trafficking in the hotel industry.
I. SEX TRAFFICKING AND HOTELS, THE TVPA, AND TVPRA
A. An Overview of the Pervasiveness of Sex Trafficking at Hotels
Within the first six months of 2019, the National Human
Trafficking Hotline had received 3,266 reports of sex trafficking.26
Sex and labor trafficking is reportedly a $150 billion criminal
enterprise, with two-thirds of that estimated amount derived from sex
trafficking.27 Unfortunately, hotels, motels, and other lodging
establishments frequently become attractive venues for traffickers
because of the anonymity and privacy that they provide.28 They are
also attractive locales for traffickers to “house their operations”
because they afford them the ability to pay in cash for hotel rooms and
not have to maintain a separate building, with associated upkeep costs,
for their criminal enterprises.29
Over a ten-year period, ranging from 2007 to 2017, the National
Human Trafficking Hotline received 3,596 reports of human
trafficking cases involving hotels and motels.30 In fact, “[s]eventy-five

26. Hotline Statistics, supra note 4 (data as of June 31, 2019).
27. See ILO Says Forced Labour Generates Annual Profits of US$ 150 Billion, INT’L LAB.
ORG. (May 20, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_243201
/lang—en/index.htm.
28. Human Trafficking and the Hospitality Industry, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign/hospitalityindustry (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
29. Ross, supra note 5, at 385.
30. BRITTANY ANTHONY ET AL., POLARIS, ON-RAMPS, INTERSECTIONS, AND EXIT ROUTES:
A ROADMAP FOR SYSTEMS AND INDUSTRIES TO PREVENT AND DISRUPT HUMAN TRAFFICKING 67
(2018), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/A-Roadmap-for-Systems-and-Indu
stries-to-Prevent-and-Disrupt-Human-Trafficking.pdf.
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percent of human trafficking victims reported that they had come into
contact with a hotel at some point while being trafficked.”31
Although trafficking can occur in low-priced motels situated in
high-crime areas of a city or town, “[h]uman traffickers operate in
every category and across every price point of the lodging industry,
from the cheapest to the most luxurious.”32 Nevertheless, inside the
confines of these high-priced hotels and economy-level motels and
inns, the indicia of sex trafficking remain the same.33
Such indicators include payment for rooms in cash or prepaid cards; extended stays with few possessions; requests for
rooms overlooking a parking lot; presence of excessive
drugs, alcohol, and/or sex paraphernalia; excessive foot
traffic in/out of hotel room; and frequent requests for new
linens, towels, and restocking of the refrigerator.34
Sex trafficking victims often exhibit signs of being afraid or anxious
and demonstrate submissive behavior.35 Other signs that a victim
might exhibit include inappropriate dress in light of the weather,
hygiene issues, sleep deprivation, malnourishment, and a lack of
control of personal belongings such as money, cell phones, or
identification cards.36 Traffickers may also attempt to restrict or
control a victim’s mobility and communications with others, as well
as try to conceal his or her whereabouts.37 Hotel employees are
uniquely positioned to detect these indicia of trafficking because they
closely interface with hotel guests and regularly enter their rooms for
servicing and cleaning.38 However, many hotel employees lack
awareness and training and thus are not aware of what to look for.39
Notably, the recent emergence of sex trafficking cases filed by
victims against hotels under a beneficiary liability theory highlight
many of these very indicators within the allegations of the
31. Ross, supra note 5, 385–86; ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 30.
32. Human Trafficking: What Business Owners Need to Know, FLA. REST. & LODGING, Fall
2018, at 20.
33. See ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 30.
34. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Recommendation Brochure by Polaris, Human Trafficking and
the Hotel Industry (2019), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/humantrafficking-hotel-industry-recommendations.pdf [hereinafter Human Trafficking Brochure]
[https://perma.cc/8WB8-7UMA].
35. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34.
36. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34.
37. Ross, supra note 5, at 386; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34.
38. ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 30.
39. Ross, supra note 5, at 413; Human Trafficking Brochure, supra note 34.
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complaints.40 Generally, these complaints allege that the hotels knew
or should have known that the victim was being subjected to sex
trafficking on its premises due to the presence of these indicia, yet
failed to report the trafficking to law enforcement or do anything to
stop it.41
B. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act and The Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
In 2000, recognizing that there was no comprehensive law in the
United States that penalized trafficking offenses, Congress enacted the
TVPA.42 With the enactment of the TVPA, Congress created new
trafficking crimes and enhanced penalties that could be imposed for
already-existing involuntary servitude crimes.43 Following its
enactment in 2000, the TVPA was reauthorized in 2003, 2005, 2008,
and 2013, with each reauthorization supplementing the Act or certain
specific provisions of the Act.44 Of these reauthorizations, the most

40. See, e.g., Complaint at 6–7, M.B. v. Roosevelt Inn LLC, No. 170300712 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Mar. 10, 2017); Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 56, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 2018-04501
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018); Notice of Removal at 19, K.R. v. Backpage.com, No. 1:17-cv-00299
(M.D. Ala. May 5, 2017); Complaint at 18–19, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (No. 2:19-cv-00849); Complaint at 14, H.H. v. G6 Hosp. LLC, No.
2:19-cv-00755 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2019); Complaint at 44–45, B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts,
Inc., No. 5:20-cv-00656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020); Complaint at 32–34, J.L. v. Best Western Int’l,
Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03713 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2019).
41. See supra note 10.
42. Gallant Fish, No Rest for the Wicked: Civil Liability Against Hotels in Cases of Sex
Trafficking, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119, 120 (2016–2017). Congress explained that prior to
the TVPA, there was no all-encompassing law in the United States that penalized the array of
offenses “involved in the trafficking scheme.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(14)–(15) (2018). It reads:
Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United States and other countries are
inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect the
gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law exists in the United States that
penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the most
brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws that also
apply to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment. . . .
In the United States, the seriousness of this crime and its components is not reflected in
current sentencing guidelines, resulting in weak penalties for convicted traffickers.
43. Fish, supra note 42, at 136; see 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13)–(15).
44. Fish, supra note 42, at 137; see also William M. Sullivan, Jr. et al., Human Trafficking
Raises Corporate Liability Concerns for the Hospitality Industry, PILLSBURY (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/human-trafficking-raises-corporate-liabilityconcerns-for-the-hospitality-industry.html (“Enacted in 2000 and subsequently revised in 2003,
2005, 2008 and 2013, the TVPA is intended to combat trafficking in persons, especially into the
sex trade, slavery and involuntary servitude.”).
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significant with regard to the issue of potential liability against hotels
were the 2003 and 2008 reauthorizations.45
The 2003 reauthorization created a civil remedy for trafficking
victims, allowing them to sue in federal court and recover damages
and attorney fees.46 Five years later, Congress expanded these civilremedy provisions with the passage of the TVPRA.47 In the 2008
reauthorization, Congress created 18 U.S.C. section 1595(a), allowing
for beneficiary liability.48 Under this provision, an individual or entity
that does not directly traffic a victim can be held liable for “knowingly
benefit[ting], financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have
known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.”49
Many states have enacted similar statutes modeled after the
TVPRA.50 For example, Pennsylvania, Texas, Michigan, and
Alabama have implemented laws that potentially hold hotels civilly
liable under a beneficiary liability theory if a sex trafficking victim is
subjected to trafficking on their premises.51
II. THE EMERGENCE OF RECENT SEX TRAFFICKING BENEFICIARY
LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST HOTELS UNDER § 1595(A)
Over the past few years, there has been a steady increase in the
beneficiary liability-type claims being filed against hotels by sex
trafficking victims pursuant to both state and federal laws.52 Some of
the first cases emerged in states like Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Alabama.53 Within the last year, the number of recorded cases
45. See Fish, supra note 42, at 137–38; William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044; Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat. 2875.
46. See Fish, supra note 42, at 137; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2003 § 4(a)(4).
47. Fish, supra note 42, at 138.
48. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018).
49. Fish, supra note 42, at 138; 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
50. Fish, supra note 42, at 142; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-157 (West, Westlaw through
Act 2020-206); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.983 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 260,
of the 2020 Reg. Sess., 100th Leg.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. S TAT. ANN. § 3051(a)(2)(i)
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 98.002
(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.).
51. Fish, supra note 42, at 142; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-157; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 752.983; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3051(a)(2)(i); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 98.002.
52. See cases supra note 9.
53. See cases supra note 9.
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involving civil liability claims brought against hotels under federal
law, specifically pursuant to § 1595, has rapidly increased.54
In 2019, “a loosely organized group of plaintiffs’ lawyers . . .
began searching for victims [subjected to sex trafficking at hotels]
through advocacy-group referrals and online advertising, leading to a
steady stream of lawsuits.”55 Many of these beneficiary liability claims
are in the infancy stage of litigation and accuse some of the bestknown hotels in the United States of ignoring sex trafficking occurring
on their premises.56 At the time of this writing, over forty lawsuits had
been filed in federal courts pursuant to § 1595 under a beneficiary
liability theory.57 For example, in early December 2019, a New York
law firm filed a landmark legal action in a federal court in Columbus,
Ohio, against twelve major hotel chains.58 The action was filed on
behalf of thirteen women—“many of whom were minors when they
said the trafficking occurred”—alleging that they were subjected to
sex trafficking at the hotels’ properties.59 “The filing marked the first
time the hotel industry . . . faced action as a group. The case drew
together 13 separate actions that had been filed in places such as Ohio,
Massachusetts, Georgia, Texas, and New York.”60
Although many beneficiary liability suits have been filed against
hotels pursuant to § 1595 since 2019, Ricchio v. McLean,61 a 2017
First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, appears to be the first recorded
opinion involving one of these claims.62 In that decision, the court of
54. See, e.g., Complaint at 20, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959
(S.D. Ohio 2019) (No. 2:19-cv-00849); Complaint at 3, H.H. v. G6 Hosp. LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00755
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2019); Complaint at 2, B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 5:20-cv00656 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020); Complaint at 2, J.L. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03713
(D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2019).
55. See Ramey, supra note 9.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Matthew Lavietes, Top Hotels Sued for ‘Industry-Wide Failures’ to Prevent U.S. Sex
Trafficking, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (Dec. 10, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://news.trust.org/
item/20191210020007-hruah/ (the lawyers sought to consolidate thirteen existing cases in the
district court of Ohio).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017). The First Circuit has remanded the case back to the district
court. See Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019).
62. Id. at 556. Plaintiff Ricchio filed her original beneficiary liability lawsuit in the United
States District Court for Massachusetts in October 2015. Complaint at 1, Peerless, No. 1:15-cv13519 (D. Mass. 2019) [hereinafter Peerless Complaint]. The district court granted the hotel
defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in 2016. Order of Feb. 16, 2016 Grating Motion to
Dismiss, Peerless, No. 1:15-cv-13519 (D. Mass. 2019). After a denial of the plaintiff’s motion to
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appeals reversed the lower court’s granting of the defendant hotel’s
motion to dismiss the sex trafficking victim’s complaint against the
hotel and its owners.63 The complaint alleged that the hotel defendants
knowingly allowed the trafficker to use the hotel’s rooms to force the
minor victim to engage in commercial sex acts.64 In reversing the
lower court, the First Circuit reasoned that the profits received from
the room rentals could establish the “knowingly benefit[ing]” standard
under § 1595 and consequently held that the victim had stated
sufficient facts in her complaint regarding the hotel’s liability under
§ 1595.65
Subsequent to Ricchio, two actions were filed in an Ohio federal
district court in March and October 2019 involving beneficiary
liability claims brought against hotels under § 1595.66 In October of
2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, in M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,67 denied motions to
dismiss filed by several hotel chain operators in an action brought by
a sex trafficking victim alleging that the trafficking occurred at
numerous hotels such as Days Inn by Wyndham, Comfort Inn, and
Crowne Plaza.68 The victim alleged that the hotel defendants knew or
should have known that her trafficking was taking place on their
properties due to the many indicators that she was being trafficked,
and thus the defendants were liable under a beneficiary liability
theory pursuant to the § 1595 of the TVPRA.69
The M.A. v. Wyndham court relied heavily on the Ricchio opinion
in denying the hotels’ motions to dismiss.70 The court applied a threepart test in analyzing whether the victim had stated a claim for
beneficiary liability under § 1595(a): “(1) the person or entity must
‘knowingly benefit[ ], financially or by receiving anything of value,’
(2) from participating in a venture, (3) that the ‘person knew or should

reconsider, the district court’s order was appealed. Notice Appeal, Peerless, No. 1:15-cv-13519 (D.
Mass. 2019).
63. Ricchio, 853 F.3d at 556.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 556–57.
66. See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 963 (S.D. Ohio 2019);
H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00755, 2019 WL 6682152, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019).
67. 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2019).
68. Id. at 962.
69. Id. at 964–65.
70. See id. at 966–70.
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have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.’”71 With
this framework established, the court concluded that the victim had
sufficiently stated facts to support each element of a beneficiary
liability claim under § 1595.72 Just two months later, this same federal
district court denied motions to dismiss filed by other hotel
defendants, including Wyndham, on the same basis.73 In this second
action, H.H. v. G6 Hospitality,74 the victim filed an action alleging
beneficiary liability against the hotels under § 1595 asserting that the
hotels were aware that sex trafficking was taking place on their
premises, failed to prevent it, and knew or should have known that the
victim was being trafficked due to indicia of trafficking, including the
housekeeping staff discovering “her chained up in the bathroom” but
ignoring her cries for help.75 Relying on the “extensive analysis”
provided in its previous decision in M.A. v. Wyndham76 and based on
the same reasoning, the court held that the victim had alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim to relief under § 1595.77 These cases
are representative of numerous cases currently being filed all over the
country.78 According to one attorney representing victims in sex
trafficking beneficiary liability litigation,
[a]bout 1,500 victims of human trafficking have retained
lawyers in the various lawsuits and as many as 7,000 are
expected over time . . . . A settlement could run into the
billions of dollars . . . because of the size of the problem and
the evidence that hotels have long known of the trafficking.79
Some experts have argued that the hotel industry needs to feel the
negative consequences—both legal and financial—of allowing
trafficking to occur on their premises or failing to have monitoring
71. Id. at 964 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018)).
72. See id. at 965–71.
73. H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00755, 2019 WL 6682152, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6,
2019).
74. No. 2:19-cv-00755, 2019 WL 6682152 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019).
75. Id. at *1.
76. Id. at *2. “In its October 7, 2019 Opinion and Order in MA v. Wyndham Hotel & Resorts,
Inc., this Court undertook an extensive analysis in a related case of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (‘TVPRA’) and its application to civil liability of hotel defendants
for sex trafficking.” Id.
77. See id. at *2–5.
78. See Ramey, supra note 9; Lavietes, supra note 58.
79. Lawsuits Allege Hotel Chains Ignored Human Trafficking, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2019,
8:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/hotels/2019/12/19/lawsuits-allege-hotel-chainsignored-human-trafficking/2696622001/.
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protocols in place to detect trafficking.80 Human trafficking scholar
Louise Shelley has noted how corporations have previously engaged
in business reform efforts to take a stance against other criminal
conduct such as drug trafficking, which came in part as a result of
negative financial, legal, and reputational consequences faced by those
companies.81 Conversely, however, those same reform efforts have
not been replicated by companies such as hotels who facilitate human
trafficking.82
Since hotels have failed to be diligent in their efforts against
trafficking, additional financial measures must be taken to address
these deficiencies and promote change in the hotel industry.83 Thus, it
is my contention that the risk of not being provided a defense or
indemnification by an insurer will undoubtedly serve as a negative
financial consequence for a hotel’s failure to implement and/or adhere
to anti-trafficking measures.
Insurance companies have in fact begun filing declaratory actions
to disclaim their duty to defend and indemnify hotels and hotel
management companies. 84 Filing these declaratory actions and
seeking to exclude coverage will allow insurers to play a regulatory
role in the fight to end sex trafficking at our nation’s hotels.
III. INSURANCE AS A REGULATOR IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SEX
TRAFFICKING AT HOTELS
Proactively engaging in anti-human trafficking compliance
is . . . necessary from both corporate social responsibility and
risk management perspectives. Indeed, not only is it an
effective way to play a significant role in the fight against
exploitation, but it also reduces business risk by mitigating a
company’s exposure to potential corporate liability.85

80. Ross, supra note 5, at 408–11; see Fish, supra note 42, at 133–34.
81. Fish, supra note 42, at 134 n.111 (discussing LOUISE SHELLEY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 134 n.110.
84. See supra note 11; see Larry P. Schiffer, Exclusion Relieves Insurer of Duty to Defend in
Sex Trafficking Case, NAT’L L. REV. (July 23, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/excl
usion-relieves-insurer-duty-to-defend-sex-trafficking-case. “In the mundane world of insurance,
sex trafficking has become a coverage issue for insurance companies when faced with an insured[]
[hotel’s] request to defend and indemnify against sex trafficking claims.” Id.
85. Sullivan et al., supra note 44.
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Insurance law scholars have argued that insurance serves a regulatory
function and that “insurers are increasingly acting as corporate
regulators.”86 “[I]nsurance institutions act as risk regulators and
regulate so many aspects of an . . . organization’s relationships in
society.”87 Insurers, thus, can use their risk management tools to
impact a corporation’s compliance with laws and corporate social
responsibility.88
Further, “[a]n insurance policy . . . is a social institution that
affects risk management [and] deterrence.”89 Through the essential
functions of risk reduction and risk management, insurance
arrangements utilize tools such as deductibles and exclusions to
incentivize private parties to reduce risks.90 Risk management tools
such as exclusions of coverage present one mechanism to reduce
“moral hazard”91—the concept that “a person carrying insurance,
knowing of the insurance coverage, might take more risks than one
who does not carry insurance.”92 Stated another way, “moral hazard”
refers to the “effect of insurance in causing the insured to relax the
care he or she takes to safeguard his or her property because the loss
will be borne in whole or part by the insurance company.”93
Because coverage exclusions directly allocate losses to
policyholders, they can have beneficial effects on controlling moral
hazard.94 Exclusions can place the burden of particular policy losses
exclusively on policyholders, which in turn can lead to policyholders
increasing their preventive efforts to reduce or eliminate the risks.95
Accordingly, the prospect of not being provided insurance
coverage due to policy exclusions, and thus having to bear the defense
costs and potentially huge damage awards alone, will likely decrease
the chance of moral hazard by hotels—that is, reduce the chance of
them failing to put forth diligent efforts in implementing anti-

86. Talesh, supra note 18, at 465.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 466.
89. Leo P. Martinez, A Unified Theory of Insurance Risk, 74 U. PITT. L. REV . 713, 722 (2013).
90. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 21, at 199.
91. See Talesh, supra note 18, at 471.
92. DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES
OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 6.2.1 (3d ed. 2019).
93. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1198, Westlaw (database updated May 2021).
94. Id.
95. Priest, supra note 23, at 648.
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trafficking preventative measures to help end the pervasiveness of sex
trafficking occurring in hotels.
An example of the regulatory impact that insurance companies
can have on insureds by using risk management tools such as
excluding coverage can be seen in sexual abuse claims against the
Catholic Church.96 “[A]fter 1987 [insurance companies] began to
refuse coverage for [clergy sexual] abuse and for failing to screen,
train, or supervise priests.”97 Even when insurers began offering this
coverage, many of the policies were subject to numerous conditions
which effectively resulted in nominal coverage to the churches.98
For example, some policies might have included coverage
exclusions for claims involving a “previously identified perpetrator”
or an exclusion for incidents of abuse that occurred prior to a certain
date.99 As a result of the conditions that were attached to these sexual
misconduct/abuse policies, the coverage afforded was often not
adequate to pay the monetary damages.100 Hence, these religious
institutions have often had the responsibility of paying these
judgments themselves.101
In instances where insurance coverage was granted, insurers
insisted that policies and procedures were implemented that would
help curtail incidents of clergy sexual misconduct.102 Consequently,
the Catholic Church began to place a greater emphasis on reform
efforts and implementation of preventative policies to end clergy
sexual abuse, including personnel screening and the creation of strict
guidelines for dealing with children.103 Accordingly, liability
96. See Alana Bartley, Note, The Liability Insurance Regulation of Religious Institutions After
the Catholic Church Sexual Abuse Scandal, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 505 (2010).
97. Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and PoliticalLegal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2017); Bartley, supra note 96, at 532 (noting that
in the early 1990s, insurers began providing coverage for clergy sexual abuse, following a period
of time where such abuse was completely excluded from coverage).
98. Bartley, supra note 96, at 532.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 533.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 534.
[T]he resulting lawsuits by the victims caused the liability insurance carriers of religious
institutions to craft conditions and exceptions to policies, and placed the majority of the
liability for the acts of clergy sexual misconduct in the hands of the religious institutions.
Religious institutions, like the Catholic Church, . . . prompted either by liability
insurance companies or on their own accord, were forced to make drastic policy changes
to avoid the resulting liability from lawsuits of clergy sexual abuse victims. Id.
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insurance companies in their regulatory roles “incentivized religious
institutions to implement policies to curb clergy sexual
misconduct.”104
Applying these concepts to the sex trafficking beneficiary
liability suits being filed against hotels, insurers are now in a position
to have a regulatory impact on the sexual abuse of trafficking victims
occurring in hotels by way of excluding coverage for these types of
claims.
IV. THE RISING TIDE OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND
THE ASSERTATION OF COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
A. Ground-Breaking Actions: Nautilus and Peerless
Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Motel Management Services, Inc.105 is
the first recorded decision where an insurer did in fact seek to disclaim
its duty to defend and indemnify the hotel operator in a sex trafficking
beneficiary liability suit based on a policy exclusion.106 In May 2018,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that because the negligence claims alleged by the
plaintiff in the underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability action
arose from negligent conduct contributing to an assault and battery,
they were barred by the insurer’s “All Assault or Battery” exclusion
in the general commercial liability policy.107 The court further noted
that the claims were barred because providing coverage would be
against Pennsylvania public policy.108 The district court’s ruling was
appealed and was later upheld by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.109
Conversely, in Peerless, a federal district court in Massachusetts
in 2019 came to a different conclusion and held that the insurer in that
case did in fact have a duty to defend its hotel insured in the underlying
sex trafficking beneficiary liability claim.110 The court concluded that

104.
105.
2019).
106.
107.
2019).
108.
109.
110.

Id.
See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (Nautilus II), 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir.
Id. at 57.
Nautilus I, 320 F. Supp. 3d 636, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir.
Id.
See Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 61.
Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019).
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a criminal acts exclusion did not preclude coverage.111 The court
further reasoned that the allegations against the hotel defendants,
which alleged that they engaged in intentional criminal conduct
violating the TVPA, did not preclude an interpretation that the
complaint included lesser allegations of negligent conduct pursuant to
the TVPRA.112 Thus, the allegations of the underlying complaint met
the state’s duty to defend standard, requiring only a “general
allegation” susceptible to a possibility of liability insurance
coverage.113
Since Nautilus and Peerless are seminal cases addressing this
vital coverage issue, an examination of arguments by the insurers and
the hotel insureds in these cases, and the policy exclusions at issue,
may be instructive and may provide guidance as to how courts will
handle this critical issue going forward. If courts find, as the Nautilus
court did, that coverage is barred based on applicable exclusions, the
reality of facing million-dollar awards without the “safety net” of
insurance coverage should incentivize hotels to effect meaningful
change in ending sex trafficking on their premises.
1. Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Motel Management Services, Inc.
Nautilus stems from an underlying action by E.B., a minor, who
sued Motel Management Services, Inc. (MMS) and the motel
operators in state court alleging that she was subjected to sex
trafficking in violation of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law.114
The victim also alleged that she was held at gun point, coerced to
participate in sex acts with traffickers, and was subjected to physical
harm.115 The complaint further avers that MMS “facilitated her
exploitation by knowingly renting rooms at its motel to the
traffickers . . . failed to intervene or to report the traffickers’ illegal
conduct; and . . . financially profited from E.B.’s exploitation.”116
In response to the victim’s lawsuit, Nautilus filed a declaratory
judgment action and asserted that it was exempted from its duty to
defend and indemnify MMS in the suit by E.B. because of the “assault
111. Id. at 189–95.
112. Id. at 195.
113. Id.
114. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 58; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. S TAT. ANN. § 3011
(West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 14).
115. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 58.
116. Id.
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and battery” exclusion in MMS’s insurance policy which excluded
claims arising out of an assault or battery, “including a failure to
prevent or suppress an assault or battery.”117 Nautilus ultimately filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the district court granted
Nautilus’s motion, “declaring that Nautilus had no duty to defend and
indemnify MMS because E.B.’s claims in the underlying action arose
from facts alleging negligent failure to prevent an assault or battery
and therefore were not covered by the insurance policy.”118
Following the district court granting Nautilus’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, MMS appealed the court’s decision to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.119 In its brief, MMS argued that it was
entitled to coverage under its policy with Nautilus because Nautilus
had a duty to provide coverage for claims of negligence and E.B. had
filed the action alleging MMS was negligent “with regard to human
trafficking violations.”120 Thus, the face of the complaint did not
implicate any of the exceptions listed in the policy that Nautilus
contended were applicable.121
The relevant policy exclusion at issue in the case stated:
[R]egardless of culpability or intent of any person, . . . there
is no coverage for “bodily injury” or “personal and
advertising injury” arising out of any: (1) actual or alleged
assault or battery; (2) physical altercation; or (3) any act or
omission in connection with the prevention or suppression of
such acts. It applies regardless of whether such actual or
alleged damages are caused by an employee, patron or any
other person. The exclusion applies to all causes of action
arising out of any assault, battery, or physical altercation
including allegations of any act, error, or omission relating to
such an assault, battery, or physical altercation. It also applies
to any claim arising out of any act or omission in connection
with the prevention or suppression of an assault, battery or
physical altercation, including failure to provide adequate

117. Id. at 59.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 58.
120. Brief of Appellant at 10, Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2290), WL
4146264, at *10 [hereinafter MMS’s Brief].
121. Id. at 10–11.
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security, negligent hiring, placement, training, or
supervision.122
In reminding the court that it was limited to considering “the four
corners of the underlying Complaint as well as the four corners of the
insurance contract” when determining the coverage issue, MMS also
argued that the court had the duty to accept the factual allegations of
the underlying complaint “as true and liberally construe[] . . . [them]
in favor of the insured.”123 MMS argued that the facts stated in the
complaint, as well as the claim for damages, have to be compared to
the insurance policy when determining whether an insured has a duty
to defend and provide coverage.124 To that end, MMS argued that
E.B.’s complaint never sought damages from the insured for harm
suffered as a result of an assault and/or rape but rather her complaint
seeks damages for negligence.125
MMS proceeded by discussing that E.B.’s allegations “stem[]
from human trafficking negligence” and that nowhere in her complaint
does E.B. allege that “MMS participated in the sex acts alleged” or
“had any direct involvement with any sex trafficker or handler.”126
Additionally, MMS argued that “based upon the definition [of human
trafficking, it is not] required that a victim of human trafficking suffer
assaultive conduct or rape.”127
MMS directed the Third Circuit to examine the specific language
of the policy which provides that the listed exclusions are applicable
when the injuries allegedly suffered “arise out of” actual assault or
battery or alleged assault or battery.128 MMS referenced the Third
Circuit’s decision in a previous unpublished opinion129 where it
reversed a summary judgment order on the basis that it could not “be
determined as a matter of law [from the allegations of the complaint]
122. Brief of Appellee at 14–15, Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x. 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2290)
(citations omitted) [hereinafter Nautilus’s Brief].
123. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 10–11.
124. See id. at 11. The brief cites Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d
286, 290 (Pa. 2007), which held that “[a]n insurer’s duty to defend an action against the insured is
measured, in the first instance, by the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings. . . . In determining the
duty to defend, the complaint claiming damages must be compared to the policy and a
determination made as to whether, if the allegations are sustained, the insurer would be required to
pay resulting judgment.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
125. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 10–11.
126. Id. at 14–15.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 20.
129. Id. (quoting Essex Ins. Co. v. Starlight Mgmt. Co., 198 F. App’x 179 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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that the [victim’s] injuries ‘arise out of’ assault and/or battery.”130
Relying on this finding, MMS argued that the court’s own precedent
required it to make a determination as to whether the damages sought
by E.B. in her complaint “ar[o]se out of” an assault or battery.131 MMS
contended that the court could not conclude this because E.B.’s
allegations “arise from” her being a human trafficking victim, which
does not equate with her being a victim of assault or battery.132 Hence,
MMS concluded that the exceptions proscribed in the policy are
“simply not implicated by the conduct alleged in this case.”133
Accordingly, MMS urged the court to hold that the listed exclusions
in Nautilus’s policy were inapplicable and require the insurer to
provide coverage to MMS because there was in fact a possibility that
the allegations fell within the policy’s coverage.134
In response to MMS arguments, the court stated that its decision
regarding whether Nautilus has a duty to defend MMS is limited to an
examination of the four corners of the complaint and how it aligns with
the actual terms of the insurance contract.135 The court urged that there
were no exceptions to the “four corners” rule, “even if the insurer
knows or should know that the allegations in the complaint are
untrue.”136
In ascertaining Nautilus’s duty to provide coverage and defend
under the policy, the court highlighted the following policy language:
The exclusion provides that Nautilus “will have no duty to
defend or indemnify any insured in any action or proceeding
alleging damages arising out of any assault or battery,”
regardless of culpability, intent, or relationship of the
perpetrator of the assault or battery to the insured, or whether
the damages occurred at premises owned or operated by the
insured. The assault and battery exclusion specifically omits
from the policy’s coverage “[a]ll causes of action arising out
of any assault or battery” or “any act, error, or omission
relating to such an assault or battery.”137
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. (second alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20–21.
Id.
Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57, 59 (3d Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 60.
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The court noted that “but for” causation was the standard for
interpreting the “arising out of” language; thus, if “an assault or battery
was a ‘but for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, the assault and battery
exclusion will apply to allegations that the insured’s negligence
contributed to the injuries.”138 The court expounded on this point and
reasoned that an insurer will only have a duty to defend when the
allegations in the complaint assert that the insured’s negligence
directly led to the plaintiff’s injuries.139
Based on this principle, the Third Circuit concluded that all of the
alleged injuries in E.B.’s underlying complaint were “the result of
exploitation and assault by traffickers and customers with whom E.B.
engaged in commercial sex acts.”140 Hence, the court held that “the
assault and battery were the ‘but for’ causes of the injuries E.B.
claims.”141 The court went on to explain that at no time in her
complaint did she allege that MMS’s negligence was the direct cause
of her injuries or caused her any separate harm; instead, E.B. averred
that MMS failed to intervene or report the actions of the sex traffickers
and financially benefited from the abuse she endured.142 The court
concluded the opinion by holding that Nautilus’s assault and battery
exclusion “unambiguously bars coverage for E.B.’s claims” because
the policy language “encompasses claims arising both from an assault
or battery and from a failure to prevent or suppress an assault and
battery.”143
MMS also challenged Nautilus’s public policy argument that
insuring against intentional tort claims or claims involving criminal
misconduct is against public policy.144 Nautilus argued that offering
coverage to the hotel for such a claim would be against Pennsylvania
138. Id.
139. Id. In holding this, the court relied on two Pennsylvania Superior Court opinions to support
its reasoning: Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) and
QBE Insurance Corp. v. M & S Landis Corp., 915 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In
Seybert, the court found that there was no duty to defend where insured bar’s negligence in serving
alcohol to visibly intoxicated men who subsequently attacked plaintiff in underlying action was
merely a contributing factor and not a direct cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Seybert, 757 A.2d at 383.
In QBE, the court found that an insurer had a duty to defend a nightclub that negligently trained
staff who restrained a patron because the negligence of the nightclub and its staff directly caused
plaintiff’s injuries. QBE, 915 A.2d at 1229.
140. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x at 60.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 21.
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public policy, as the complaint alleged knowing involvement of
criminal acts.145 Specifically, it asserted that the complaint alleged that
the hotel was in violation of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law
“by harboring her, failing to report alleged human trafficking and
involuntary sexual servitude to the authorities” despite knowing of the
trafficking, and knowingly profiting financially as a result of the
minor’s involuntary servitude.146 Because the Pennsylvania legislature
had pronounced that this conduct was criminal, and thus against public
policy, there was no expectation that insurers would defend or
indemnify their insureds who fall into these situations.147
In response, MMS argued that its agents never engaged in an
intentional tort nor did E.B.’s complaint or Nautilus aver that MMS
engaged in an intentional tort.148 Thus, the district court’s rationale
could only hold relevance if MMS participated in criminal
misconduct.149 In noting that it is a regular practice for insurance
companies to provide coverage to insureds when third parties commit
a crime, MMS acknowledged that coverage is typically barred when
the insured commits the crime.150 However, it disputed that it engaged
in any criminal conduct and criticized the district court for providing
“limited analysis” on this point by simply stating that “financially
benefitting from human sex trafficking is criminalized under the
Pennsylvania Human Trafficking Law . . . [t]hus public policy
precludes coverage.”151
MMS asserted that “financially benefitting” from sex trafficking
has not been criminalized in Pennsylvania.152 MMS further rebutted
the district court by stating that “[i]f this Court actually review[ed] 18
Pa. C.S. Section 3011(a)(2), there is a mens rea aspect to the crime. A
party must knowingly benefit financially to have committed a
crime.”153 Additionally, MMS argued that E.B.’s complaint also
alleged that MMS violated Pennsylvania’s sex trafficking statute by
145. Nautilus’s Brief, supra note 122, at 20.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 6.
148. MMS’s Brief, supra note 120, at 22.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Nautilus I, 320 F. Supp. 3d 636, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x. 57
(3d Cir. 2019)).
152. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3011 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Reg. Sess. Act 14)).
153. Id.
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“‘harboring’ E.B. which caused or permitted her to engage in
commercial sex acts” but that section also contains a “knowing”
requirement.154 Specifically, MMS contended that pursuant to section
3011(a)(1), a person commits a crime if he “recruits, entices, solicits,
harbors, transports, provides, obtains or maintains an individual [and]
the person knows or recklessly disregards that the individual will be
subject to involuntary servitude.”155 Based on this provision, MMS
reasoned that since the scope of E.B.’s allegations could lead to a
finding that MMS acted negligently while not finding that MMS
possessed the requisite knowledge to have committed a crime under
section 3011(a)(1), public policy did not bar coverage.156
The Third Circuit never addressed either parties’ public policy
arguments but rather held that since the allegations of the complaint
triggered the assault and battery exclusion and thus precluded
coverage, there was no need to address whether public policy would
also bar coverage for the intentional torts and criminal misconduct that
E.B. pled in her complaint.157
2. Peerless
In November 2019, four months after the Third Circuit’s decision
in Nautilus, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that an
insurer, Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company, did have a duty to
defend a motel that was accused of financially benefitting from the sex
trafficking of a victim at its insured’s motel.158 In the underlying
action, the victim alleged that she was kidnapped by the trafficker, one
of the named defendants, in 2011 and brought to the Shangri-La motel
in Massachusetts, owned by Bijal, Inc.159 The complaint further
alleged that other co-defendants in the underlying action, the Patels,
lived and were employed at the motel during the time that the victim
was held captive by her trafficker, where she was repeatedly raped,
abused, and told that she would be forced to perform commercial sex
acts.160 The victim alleged that the Patels were aware of her trafficking
154. Id.
155. Id. at 22–23.
156. Id. at 23.
157. Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit rendered its decision in
an unpublished brief opinion on July 22, 2019.
158. Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019); Schiffer, supra note 84.
159. Peerless Complaint, supra note 62, at 1–2.
160. Id.
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and financially profited from it.161 Specifically, the complaint asserts
that the insured motel and the Patels violated the TVRPA by
financially benefitting from the sex trafficker’s conduct at the motel
by way of its receipt of rent payments for the rooms where the
trafficking occurred.162
Peerless had issued two insurance policies to the insured motel
that were at issue in the declaratory judgment action—a general
liability policy and an umbrella policy.163 Two types of coverage were
provided under the general liability policy, “Coverage A” and
“Coverage B.”164 Under “Coverage A,” “Bodily Injury and Property
Damage Liability,” Peerless agreed to pay for damages due to “bodily
injury.”165 One key exclusion provided under Coverage A was
“Exclusion (o), entitled ‘Personal and Advertising Injury,’” which
excluded coverage for “‘bodily injury’ arising out of ‘personal and
advertising injury.’”166 This section defined “personal and advertising
injury” as “injury, including consequential ‘bodily injury,’ arising out
of one or more” of a list of “offenses,” which included false
imprisonment.167
“Coverage B,” “Personal and Advertising Injury,” provided
coverage for personal and advertising injury but listed numerous
categories of exclusions.168 Of particular importance was “Exclusion
(d),” “Criminal Acts,” which stated that the policy did not apply to
“‘[p]ersonal and advertising injury’ arising out of a criminal act
committed by or at the direction of the insured.”169
Peerless argued in its brief to the district court that all of the
victim’s claims were barred under exclusion (o) of Coverage A, which
161. Id. at 6, 14.
162. Id.
163. Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 187.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. In addition to the general liability policy, the motel had an umbrella policy that
provided that Peerless would pay “those sums in excess of the ‘retained limit’ that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay damages because of ‘bodily injury.’” Id. Further, the umbrella
policy provided coverage for “‘[p]ersonal and advertising injury’ caused by an ‘offense’ arising out
of [the insured’s] business.” Id. at 188. (alterations in original). Akin to the general liability policy,
the umbrella policy also included numerous categories of exclusions. Particularly, “Exclusion (s),”
“Personal and Advertising Injury,” stated that the umbrella policy was inapplicable to “personal
and advertising injury . . . [a]rising out of a criminal act committed by or at the direction of any
insured.” Id.
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excluded coverage for “bodily injury” arising out of false
imprisonment.170 The victim countered this argument in her brief,
asserting that the source of her personal injury was the trafficker’s “act
of trafficking her for labor and sex”—not her false imprisonment.171
The court rejected this argument, however, and noted that the victim
failed to provide anything “to suggest why her alleged injuries should
be understood as ‘arising out’ of her trafficking but not out of her
imprisonment.”172
The district court in its opinion noted other Massachusetts
precedent that reasoned that the phrase “arising out of” should have a
broad interpretation that requires a “‘sufficiently close relationship’ or
a ‘reasonably apparent’ causal connection between the injury and
relevant event.”173 Accordingly, the district court held that it would
“construe the phrase ‘arising out of’ to have its typical meaning under
Massachusetts law. . . . [which] leads . . . to the conclusion that [the
victim’s] injuries arose out of her false imprisonment” and were thus
excluded under Coverage A.174
As to Coverage B, which provided coverage for “personal injury”
“caused by an offense arising out of [the insured’s] business,” Peerless
argued that the victim’s injuries were also barred based on certain
exclusions.175 Peerless’s main argument was that the victim’s claims
were barred by exclusion (d) of Coverage B, which precludes coverage
for “personal injury” “arising out of criminal acts committed by or at
the direction of the insured.”176 More specifically, Peerless argued that
170. Id. at 189–90.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 190.
173. Id. (quoting AIG Prop. Cas. Co. v. Cosby, 892 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2018)).
174. Id. at 191.
175. Id. at 192.
176. Id. In examining the first two issues, the court stated:
First—and somewhat inconsistently—Peerless contends that Ricchio’s injuries do not
amount to a personal injury because they are “based upon alleged violations of the
TVPA,” and the TVPA “does not constitute a ‘personal . . . injury.’” It is not entirely
clear what Peerless means by that. The relevant question is whether Ricchio’s injuries—
which she alleges were caused by violations of the TVPA—constitute a personal injury.
Because the definition of personal injury under the policy includes injuries arising out
of false imprisonment, and because Ricchio’s injuries at least in part arose out of her
false imprisonment, the answer to that question is yes.
Id.
As to the second argument, the court continued:
Second, Peerless contends that Ricchio’s injuries were not caused by an offense “arising
out” of Bijal’s business, because Bijal is not “in the business of human trafficking.” The
trafficking that allegedly took place here, however, encompassed multiple acts, including
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the injuries suffered by the victim were caused by the Patels’ criminal
violations of the TVPA and, thus, were barred by exclusion (d).177
In response, the victim argued that exclusion (d) was inapplicable
because she alleged in the complaint that the motel and Patels
financially benefitted from the trafficker’s crime—a civil violation of
the TVPRA.178 Thus, exclusion (d) did not apply because it required
the criminal act be committed by or at the direction of defendants.179
Examining the provisions of the Acts, the court found that each
of the TVPA’s criminal provisions had a “mens rea requirement of
knowing or reckless conduct by the accused.”180 Conversely, the court
noted that the TVPRA’s civil provisions did not have the same
requirement and only required that a person “knowingly benefit[], . . .
from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have
known has engaged in an act in violation” of the Act to be held
liable.181 The court further noted that the “knew or should have
known” language “echoes common language used in describing an
objective standard of negligence.”182 Hence, the district court
concluded that it was feasible for a defendant to be civilly liable
without having committed any criminal violations under the Act
because it allows a victim to recover under a civil standard even where
there is no proof of intentional conduct.183

the Patels’ [hotel managers] alleged agreement to continue renting a room to McLean
[trafficker], providing him with the privacy he needed to perform the abuse. And it is
clear that the act of renting a room to McLean satisfies the “two-prong test” used by
Massachusetts courts to “determin[e]” whether “an activity” that caused an injury
“ar[ose] out of . . . [an] insured’s business.” That test, as the name suggests, requires
asking two questions: (1) whether the activity is “one in which the insured regularly
engages as a means of livelihood,” and (2) whether “the purpose of the activity [is] be to
obtain monetary gain.” Here, the complaint clearly alleges that defendants regularly
rented out rooms to overnight guests, and that they did so for the purpose of making
money. Indeed, providing rooms for money is surely the core function of Bijal’s business
as a motel. Accordingly, Ricchio has shown that her alleged injuries were caused, at least
in part, by an offense arising out of Bijal’s business.
Id. (quoting Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 32 N.E. 3d 336, 341 (Mass. App. Ct.
2015)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 193 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a); 1590(a); 1591(a); 1594(a-b); 1593A (2018)).
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 966 (S.D. Ohio
2019) (allowing plaintiff to pursue liability claims under the TVPRA against two hotels and finding
that the statute “invokes a negligence standard”)).
183. Id. at 194.
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The court then turned to the question of whether the victim’s
allegations in the complaint were “‘reasonably susceptible’ to a
‘possibility’ of insurance liability under the coverage.”184 The
“reasonably susceptible” standard had been discussed earlier in the
opinion where the court explained that in order for the duty to defend
to be triggered, the allegations in the underlying complaint need only
be “reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that they state or
adumbrate a claim covered by the policy terms.”185 The court further
noted that there was “no requirement that the facts alleged in the
complaint specifically and unequivocally make out a claim within the
coverage.”186
With this standard as the backdrop, the court examined the claims
asserted by the victim in the complaint against the motel and the Patels
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), which essentially alleged intentional
violations of the Act.187
The court concluded that although all the claims were “cast in
terms of intentional, not negligent, conduct,” the allegations only had
to establish generally a “possibility that the liability claim falls within
the insurance coverage.”188 The court concluded that although the
victim’s claims allege that the Patels engaged in criminal conduct, the
complaint is “‘reasonably susceptible’ to an interpretation finding only
negligence.”189 “The fact that the complaint alleges intentional
conduct does not preclude an interpretation that it also includes lesser
allegations of negligent conduct. That approach accords with the
184. Id.
185. Id. at 188 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. SCA Servs., Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1346, 1347
(Mass. 1992)).
186. Id. (quoting Billings v. Com. Ins. Co., 936 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 2010)).
187. Id. at 194. For example, two of the claims alleged against the motel and the Patels were
that they
“knowingly benefitted from participat[ing] in [the trafficker’s] venture, knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that the venture was engaged in the providing or obtaining
of [the victim's] labor or services by means of . . . force . . .” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1589. . . . [And] “knowingly harbored and maintained [the victim] at [the motel] and
benefitted from her labor and services, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that
means of force, fraud, [and] coercion . . . would be used to force [the victim] to engage
in commercial sex acts,” “knowingly benefitted from participation in [the trafficker’s]
venture, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force . . . would be used
to cause . . . [the victim] to engage in a commercial sex act,” and “aided and abetted [the
trafficker],” all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591.
Id.
188. Id. at 194–95 (quoting Billings, 936 N.E.2d at 414).
189. Id. at 195.
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Massachusetts duty to defend standard that requires only a ‘general
allegation’ susceptible to a ‘possibility’ of liability insurance
coverage.”190 Hence, the court held that the victim’s claims were
“reasonably susceptible to a possibility of insurance liability under
Coverage B” and Peerless had a duty to defend the motel under the
policy.191
B. The Implications of Nautilus and Peerless
Since Nautilus and Peerless, there has been an uptick in the
number of related declaratory judgment actions being filed. Less than
one year after the Pennsylvania federal district court’s opinion in
Nautilus, another insurer filed a similar declaratory judgment action
against its hotel insured and hotel management company arguing that
it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the hotel insured against
a sex trafficking beneficiary liability suit.192 Samsung Fire and Marine
Insurance Co., v. UFVS Management Co., filed in the same
Pennsylvania district court as Nautilus, stemmed from three
underlying sex trafficking beneficiary liability actions against the
management company, hotel insured, Roosevelt Inn, and hotel
managers/owners.193 Samsung is seeking a declaration from the court
that it does not owe the hotel defendants a duty to defend or indemnify
against the underlying actions, asserting the following arguments and
policy exclusions:

190. Id.
191. Id. Additionally, in noting that Peerless had a duty to defend, the court reasoned it did not
express any view on whether Peerless also had a duty to indemnify which “is determined under a
different standard.” Id. "[T]he issue of indemnification must await the completing of trial or
settlement." Id. (quoting AIG Prop. Cas. Co. v. Green, 217 F. Supp. 3d 415, 425 (D. Mass. 2016)).
There is “a meaningful difference between an insurer’s duty to defend . . . and a duty to indemnify.”
Id. at 188. (quoting Wilkinson v. Citation Ins. Co., 856 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Mass. 2006)). Unlike the
duty to indemnify, which “arises only after the insured’s liability has been established,” “[t]he duty
to defend arises in situations involving . . . actual litigation by a third party, a context in which time
is of the essence, and in which cost and complexity can compound each passing day.” Id. at 195
(quoting Wilkinson, 856 N.E.2d at 836). “Accordingly, the issue of whether Peerless has a duty to
defend the Patels and Bijal is ripe for adjudication.” Id. at 188. The court also concluded that
Peerless had a duty to defend the motel under the umbrella liability policy. See id. at 195 (explaining
that “personal and advertising injury” damages are covered under the umbrella policy and that no
exclusions listed in that policy barred coverage).
192. Complaint at 1, 3–4, Samsung Fire and Marine Ins. Co., v. UFVS Mgmt. Co., No. 2:18cv-04365-CDJ (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Samsung Complaint].
193. Plaintiff Samsung Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (U.S. Branch)’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1–6, Samsung, No. 2:18-cv-04365-CDJ
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Samsung’s Memo iso Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings].
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First and foremost, public policy bars coverage for the
allegations of sex trafficking asserted in the Underlying
Actions. Furthermore, there is no coverage for such claims
as the Plaintiff’s claimed injuries were not the result of an
“occurrence” as required by the Samsung Policies because
such injuries were not an “accident,” were not fortuitous, and
were the known and expected consequence of the Roosevelt
Defendants’ actions. Coverage is also excluded under the
“expected or intended” injury exclusion in the Samsung
Policies. In addition, although the Roosevelt Defendants
claim that the underlying Plaintiffs’ claims are for “personal
and advertising injury,” the Underlying Actions do not
include claims of false arrest, detention or imprisonment or
any other type of “personal and advertising injury” as defined
by the Samsung Policies.194
The Samsung declaratory judgment action is still ongoing.
In addition to Samsung, other similar declaratory judgment
actions have emerged since Nautilus and Peerless.195 In April 2020,
two declaratory actions were initiated by insurers in federal district
courts in New York and Georgia in response to sex trafficking
beneficiary liability actions filed against hotel insureds.196
Atain Specialty Insurance Co. v. Varahi Hotel, LLC197 was filed
in a Georgia federal district court based on an underlying action by a
sex trafficking victim alleging beneficiary liability against Varahi
Hotel.198 In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff averred that “various
hotel managers and owners, including Varahi, were involved in and/or
benefited from sex-trafficking at their hotels.”199
Atain’s declaratory judgment action asserted that Varahi Hotels
was not entitled to a defense or indemnification pursuant to various
policy exclusions.200 Atain alleged that it “has no obligation to defend
and/or indemnify Varahi for any liability arising out of the Underlying
194. Id. at 2. Samsung also argued that “since Roosevelt Motor Inn, Inc. is not an Insured under
the Samsung Policies that are at issue in this lawsuit, Samsung is not obligated to defend or
indemnify Roosevelt Motor Inn, Inc. in the Underlying Actions.” Id.
195. See, e.g., Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 1; Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
196. Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 1; Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
197. Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
198. Id. at 10.
199. Id.
200. See generally id. at 1.
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Lawsuit,” as the policy’s “Physical-Sexual Abuse,” “Criminal Acts,”
“Injury on Normally Occupied Premises,” “Knowing Violation of
Rights of Another,” and “Known Injury or Damage” exclusions all bar
coverage.201 Additionally, Atain alleged that the sex trafficking claims
against Varahi did not constitute an “occurrence,” and thus were also
precluded by an “Expected or Intended Injury” exclusion.202 The Atain
declaratory action was settled in January 2021.
Approximately a week after the filing of Atain, Starr Indemnity
& Liability filed a declaratory action in a New York federal district
court in the matter of Starr Indemnity & Liability Co. v. Choice Hotels
International, Inc.,203 based on an underlying action by a sex
trafficking victim alleging beneficiary liability against Choice Hotels
and other hotel defendants.204
In its declaratory judgment action, Starr asserted that Choice
Hotels is not entitled to a defense or indemnity in connection with the
underlying sex trafficking lawsuit due to the “abuse or molestation
exclusion” in the applicable insurance policies.205 Starr’s declaratory
judgment action is in its infancy stage and thus is still pending before
the New York federal district court. Going forward, it will be
interesting to see how courts rule in these declaratory judgment
matters. In examining the policy exclusions at issue in the Nautilus
and Peerless decisions and those at issue in the Samsung, Atain, and
Starr Indemnity actions, there appear to be common exclusions being
raised by insurers as the basis for their arguments that coverage is
barred.206 Of the cases discussed, Nautilus is the only insurer that
raised an “assault and battery exclusion” as the basis for its position
that it did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify.207 It also argued that
providing coverage was against Pennsylvania public policy,208 which
insurer Samsung asserted as well in its declaratory judgment action.209
201. Id. at 13–15.
202. Id. at 14–15. Atain also asserted in the complaint that Varahi was not a Named Insured or
additional Insured under the applicable policy. Id. at 11.
203. Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
204. Id. at 4.
205. Id. at 5.
206. See Complaint, Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 2:17-CV-04491)
[hereinafter Nautilus Complaint]; Peerless Complaint, supra note 62, at 1; Atain Complaint, supra
note 11, at 1; Samsung Complaint, supra note 192, at 1; Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
207. See Nautilus Complaint, supra note 206, at 9–10.
208. See id. at 11.
209. See Samsung’s Memo iso Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, supra note 193, at 2.
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Other common exclusions raised in these cases included the “personal
and advertising injury,” “criminal acts,” and “expected or intended
injury,” as well as “physical-sexual abuse” or “abuse or molestation”
exclusions.210 Finally, the argument that the alleged sex trafficking
activities at the hotels are excluded from coverage because they do not
constitute “an occurrence” under the applicable policies appears to be
a common assertion being made by insurers.211
So, with the myriad of exclusions being raised, the question
arises: how will these courts and others rule on this critical coverage
issue? Will their decisions align with the Third Circuit’s decision in
Nautilus and conclude that applicable policy exclusions, and
potentially public policy, bar coverage to hotels in these sex
trafficking beneficiary liability claims, or will they hold in a manner
similar to the Peerless court, finding that exclusions asserted by the
insurer do not bar coverage and the insurer owes a defense, and
potentially indemnification, to the hotel insured?
Based on the similarity in the exclusions at issue in Samsung and
Nautilus and the fact that the Samsung case is before the same district
court as Nautilus, some predictions can be made as to the possible
outcome in Samsung. Similar to the insurer in Nautilus, Samsung’s
declaratory judgment complaint also raises a public policy argument
as the basis for why the court should find that it does not have a duty
to defend or indemnify the hotel insureds.212 Like Nautilus, Samsung
argues that since the victim’s complaint alleges criminal violations of
trafficking, Pennsylvania public policy precludes coverage.213
Specifically, Samsung’s complaint alleges that the allegations of the
underlying action aver that the hotel defendants “harbored, maintained
and financially profited” from the victim’s trafficking and knowingly
rented rooms and provided other services to persons engaged in sex
trafficking, all in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking
Law.214 The complaint goes on to allege that Pennsylvania’s Human
Trafficking Law “represents a declaration of Pennsylvania public
policy that harboring, maintaining and financially profiting from
commercial sex trafficking is a criminal act.”215 Thus, as Nautilus
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See sources cited supra note 206.
See Nautilus Complaint, supra note 206, at 11–12; Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 12.
Samsung Complaint, supra note 192, at 7–8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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argued, it would be against public policy for Samsung to indemnify
the hotel insureds who have allegedly engaged in criminal conduct in
violation of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law.216
As discussed, the Third Circuit in its Nautilus decision did not
address any of the public policy arguments raised by the parties.217
Instead, it held that since the assault and battery exclusion precluded
coverage, there was no need to address whether public policy would
also bar coverage for the intentional torts and criminal misconduct that
the plaintiff plead in her complaint.218
The district court’s holding in Nautilus, however, is instructive as
to what the Samsung court may conclude regarding Samsung’s public
policy argument. Reasoning that it was against Pennsylvania public
policy law to “insure against claims for intentional torts or criminal
acts,” the district court in Nautilus held that “financially benefitting”
from sex trafficking is a criminal offense under Pennsylvania’s
trafficking law and thus public policy barred coverage.219
Accordingly, because the allegations in the underlying sex trafficking
suit against the hotel defendants in Samsung allege that they
“financially profited” from the victim’s sex trafficking,220 it is likely
that the Samsung court, following the district court’s holding in
Nautilus, will also find that Pennsylvania public policy bars insurance
coverage to the hotel insureds.
The Peerless decision may also bear some weight on how the
Atain court rules on the criminal acts exclusion being raised by the
insurer and its applicability to the sex trafficking victim’s claims in the
underlying suit. Although the Atain declaratory action is in its infancy,
if the federal district court hearing the case ultimately aligns its
decision with the Peerless court’s holding, Atain’s argument that
Exclusion (d), “Criminal Acts” precludes coverage to the hotel
insureds will likely fail. The Atain General Commercial Liability
policy contains virtually the same provisions and exclusions that were
at issue in Peerless.221 As was the case in Peerless, Coverage B of the
216. Id.
217. See Nautilus II, 781 F. App’x 57, 60 n.5 (3d Cir. 2019).
218. Id.
219. Nautilus I, 320 F. Supp. 3d 636, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x 57 (3d Cir.
2019).
220. See Samsung Complaint, supra note 192, at 7–8.
221. Compare Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 5–10, with Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d 182,
187–88 (D. Mass. 2019).
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applicable policy, “Personal and Advertising Injury Liability,”
provided coverage for damages caused by an offense arising out of the
hotel insured’s business.222 However, Exclusion (d), “Criminal Acts,”
excluded coverage for any personal injury “arising out of a criminal
act committed by or at the direction of the insured.”223 Peerless
attempted to rely on the criminal acts exclusion to argue that since the
victim’s injuries were a result of the hotel managers’ criminal
violations of the TVPA, the victim’s claims were not covered by the
policy.224 In rejecting this argument, the Peerless court analyzed some
of the provisions of the TVPRA and reasoned that the Act allowed a
victim to recover civilly under § 1595(a) when the person or entity
knew or should have known that the trafficker was in violation of the
Act, thus allowing for liability under a negligence standard.225 Hence,
the court found that although the victim couched her sex trafficking
allegations against the hotel managers in language asserting that they
committed intentional criminal misconduct, there was a possibility
that the complaint was “‘reasonably susceptible’ to an interpretation
finding only negligence” and that a defendant could be civilly liable
without having committed any criminal acts under the TVPA.226
Accordingly, the court held that the criminal acts exclusion would not
bar coverage if the hotel insureds’ negligent conduct facilitated the sex
trafficking.227
Because Atain and Peerless address the same criminal acts
exclusion, it is possible that the Atain court may rely on the Peerless
court’s analysis to guide its decision on whether this exclusion
precludes coverage for the hotel. If the Atain court adopts the Peerless
court’s reasoning, Atain’s argument that Exclusion (d) bars coverage
will likely be unsuccessful, and Atain will have to convince the court
that some other exclusion applies in order to relinquish the duty to
defend and indemnify the hotel insured.
As is apparent from the sampling of cases discussed in this
section, insurers are raising a variety of exclusions in their declaratory

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Atain Complaint, supra note 11, at 8.
Id.
Peerless, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 192.
Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 195.
Id.
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actions.228 Coverage decisions by courts will therefore be determined
on a case-to-case basis, examining the exclusions being asserted by
the insurer and the factual allegations made in the underlying sex
trafficking beneficiary liability suits against hotel insureds. If more
courts align their rulings with the Nautilus decision and find that
coverage is barred by applicable exclusions in these declaratory
actions, the reality of not being afforded coverage, and paying the
costs of defense and potentially millions of dollars in damages, will
add a further layer of legal and financial consequences for hotels’
liability. This reality should incentivize hotels to implement
preventative measures and protocols to curtail and hopefully
ultimately end the proliferation of sex trafficking on their premises.
C. An Alternative to Exclusions: Other Risk Management Tools That
Can Have a Regulatory Impact
Even if courts decide, however, that insurers have to provide
hotels defense and indemnification in underlying sex trafficking
lawsuits, insurers can still serve as regulators—impacting hotel antitrafficking prevention efforts—by employing other risk management
tools such as auditing, training, and educational services.
The cyber liability insurance industry exemplifies this form of
regulation. In the cyber liability insurance context, insurers not only
pool and transfer an insured’s risk to the insurer and provide defense
and indemnification, but they also provide risk management services
that proactively impact how a corporation responds to a data breach,
for example.229 Cybersecurity risks relate to things such as “loss
exposure associated with the use of electronic equipment, computers,
information technology, and virtual reality” and reflect some of the
greatest emerging threats to corporations and consumers.230 Many
corporations do not feel that they are adequately prepared for
cybersecurity risks and feel like they do not properly allocate funds,
training, or resources to protect consumers’ electronic data from

228. See sources cited supra note 206. For example, the “abuse and molestation” exclusion
raised in the Starr declaratory judgment action was not raised by either of the insurance companies
in Nautilus and Peerless. Starr Complaint, supra note 11, at 3. Thus, because Nautilus and Peerless
dealt with different exclusions, they do not provide much guidance for how the New York district
court may rule on the coverage issue.
229. Talesh, supra note 18, at 475.
230. Id. at 474.
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privacy breaches.231 In response, cyber insurers, acting as compliance
regulators, utilize their risk management services to help organizations
prevent data breaches from occurring, as well as assist them in
identifying breaches and developing proper responses if they do
occur.232
For example, some of the risk management or prevention services
that cyber insurers offer include auditing cyber security practices and
performing “cyber health checks.”233 Following these audits and
checks, corporations are rated, and insurers offer security and privacy
recommendations.234 “Insurers then ‘scan’ hidden risks on publicfacing infrastructures, provide a detailed view of a company’s
vulnerability status, and prioritize vulnerabilities.”235 At this stage, the
insurance company or a third-party vendor examines whether existing
firewalls, web and email servers are effective and, if not, identify ways
to alleviate any vulnerabilities.236
In addition to assessing risk and providing auditing services,
cyber insurers also regulate corporations’ decision-making process
and overall corporate behavior by supplying enhanced services such
as comprehensive written materials that advise them on how to detect
and prevent data breaches.237 These materials can be in the form of
“cyber news and blogs, best-practices checklists, monthly newsletters,
articles and whitepapers . . . webinars, and legal summaries.”238
Additionally, insurers provide corporations access to websites
operated by the insurer that provide resources on proper training of
staff, identification of loss exposure, and evolving compliance issues
and laws.239
Risk prevention tools such as those described serve an essential
regulatory role on corporations.240 The scans and cyber health checks
can be utilized as a precondition to determine if a corporation will be
eligible for cyber insurance.241 Consequently, corporations who are
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 479.
Id.
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interested in securing cyber insurance become more diligent in their
cyber practices and ensuring they have prevention tools in place.242
This in turn, increases the likelihood that insurers will lower
premiums.243
In line with cyber insurers, hotel insurers should consider
implementing similar risk management strategies to promote change
in corporate behavior amongst hotels. For instance, hotel insurers
could provide “auditing” services to determine what, if any, antitrafficking measures or protocols are in place at a hotel and assess their
efficacy. After this assessment, insurers could work with hotels to
make sure that proper anti-trafficking training is being presented to
managers and staff that promotes awareness, detection, and reporting
procedures to authorities.
Additionally, insurers can regularly provide written materials to
hotel insureds to support workplace training measures, such as
newsletters, blogs, and legal updates highlighting the legal
consequences of not implementing and maintaining proper antitrafficking training and prevention protocols.
Although some hotels have voluntarily created and implemented
initiatives to fight against sex trafficking in their establishments,244
many have not. Insurers can therefore aide in these efforts by soliciting
third-party
vendors,
including
leading
anti-trafficking
organizations,245 to provide this essential training.246 Many states, in
fact, have recently mandated that hotels provide anti-trafficking
training.247 Thus, hotel insurers, like cyber insurers, can act as
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Giovanna L. C. Cavagnaro, Sex Trafficking: The Hospitality Industry’s Role and
Responsibility 12–
13 (May 2007) (B.S. thesis, Cornell University), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/7132
5; cf. About, THE CODE, https://www.thecode.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
245. See Susan Haigh, Hotel Employees Get Training to Spot Human Trafficking, SKIFT
(June 25, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://skift.com/2017/06/25/HOTEL-EMPLOYEES-GETTRAINING-TO-SPOT-HUMAN-TRAFFICKING/. Anti-trafficking organizations Polaris and
ECPAT-USA have worked with Marriott, for example, in creating curriculum that is used by
Marriott to train its employees. Id.
246. See Talesh, supra note 18, at 148.
247. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-106g (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Reg. Sess., the
2020 July Spec. Sess., and the 2020 Sept. Spec. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 157.177 (West, Westlaw
from the 2020 Reg. Sess. and 1st through 7th Spec. Sess.); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.3 (Deering
2021); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 206-f (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2020, ch. 1 to 387); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 509.096(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 184 of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 26th
Leg.).
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compliance regulators by helping to ensure that anti-trafficking
trainings occur and are done timely in accordance with applicable state
laws. As an incentive for those that do have proper training and
protocols in place, insurance carriers could consider offering premium
reductions to hotel insureds.
By taking these measures, insurers will be leveraging other risk
management strategies—in addition to coverage exclusions—to
induce hotels’ active participation in eradicating sex trafficking in the
hotel industry.
CONCLUSION
Meaningful change can start with hotels committing to antitrafficking training measures and protocols that will help their workers
have greater awareness of trafficking indicators and, in turn, be more
vigilant in reporting suspicious activity. The increased potential of
insurers taking a stance that they will not defend or indemnify hotel
insureds faced with these claims, and the regulatory impact that that
stance imposes, should serve as an additional catalyst for hotels to
implement anti-trafficking measures. Even if courts find that insurers
have to defend and indemnify hotel insureds, insurers can still serve
as regulators by utilizing other risk management tools such as auditing,
training, and educational services to help interdict the burgeoning sex
trafficking problem that exists at our nation’s hotels.

